Sunday, 03 August, 2025
As the historic month of August draws near, a rising wave of unease is sweeping across Bangladesh. This anxiety is not without reason.
Recent developments, along with a report published in a vernacular daily, allege that ousted leaders of the banned Awami League are planning to incite unrest during this politically sensitive month—one closely associated with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
Speaking to The Bangladesh Express, several political analysts warned that Bangladesh may be heading toward heightened instability due to three major political developments: the anticipated announcement of the long-awaited national election schedule; the reported return of BNP Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman after 15 years in exile; and mounting friction among political parties over key reform proposals that will ultimately require parliamentary approval.
Despite repeated appeals for unity from Dr Yunus, divisions remain stark among the parties that coalesced around the July Movement. These groups, once seen as standard-bearers of a post-Awami League future, are now fractured over key reform issues and increasingly hostile towards one another. The resulting rift is placing growing strain on an already brittle consensus.
Tensions reached a new high following a report in Amar Desh alleging that former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal—now based in India—is actively mobilising forces to spark unrest during August. The report claimed that groups are being trained in Dhaka’s Bashundhara area and are preparing to cross the border to carry out coordinated disruption. This comes in the wake of last year’s events, when enraged demonstrators demolished the historic house at Dhanmondi 32, the former residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
These developments have fuelled growing public anxiety, as thousands of people—including teachers, women, and workers—take to the streets with a range of demands. In the capital, even passenger stoppages are crowded with so-called deprived groups rallying to press their grievances. Hopes for a peaceful democratic transition are now increasingly clouded by fears of confrontation and unrest.
Yet, the spectre of street clashes looms large. Many fear that if Awami League loyalists launch mass mobilisation in August—while July Movement supporters remain active and agitated groups continue to gather in the capital—the situation could spiral into violent conflict, potentially prompting military intervention.
Concerns are growing over the interim government's inability to maintain law and order, further exacerbated by high-profile incidents like the broad-daylight murder of a businessman in Mitford, unrest in Gopalganj, and attacks on NCP leaders.
Extortion, rent-seeking, and organised theft continue to disrupt business activity, fuelling further discontent. Political coherence remains elusive. BNP and Jamaat are entangled in internal rivalries, while the Jatiya Party—viewed by many as a former Awami League collaborator—has become politically marginalised. Veteran left-wing leaders warn that if trained AL activists flood the streets, the resulting confrontations could edge the country closer to civil war.
Meanwhile, key reforms promised by the interim administration have largely stalled. Of the 11 reform commissions set up after the July Uprising—addressing electoral laws, the constitution, the judiciary, policing, and public administration—only four have submitted reports, none of which have been implemented. A broader consultative process, once promised to include students, civil society, political parties, and officials, has yet to materialise. This vacuum risks undermining the tenuous consensus achieved in the aftermath of July.
Official claims of stability appear increasingly out of touch with reality. Crime data from January 2025 paint a stark picture: 294 murders and 105 abductions were recorded—the worst monthly figures in six years. Civil unrest is expanding beyond the political realm. Student demonstrations, garment worker strikes, and protests by professionals have all surged. In one recent incident, autorickshaw drivers shut down Banani for six hours, prompting a rare and alarming deployment of army troops.
The economic outlook is equally bleak. Spiralling inflation has sharply reduced household purchasing power. Government studies show food distribution via public channels has dropped 7% year-on-year, even as prices for staples like rice and lentils continue to rise. While the World Bank has reported a narrowing current account deficit, fiscal pressures remain high. Revenue shortfalls and ballooning subsidies threaten long-term stability. More alarmingly, nearly three million people are projected to fall into extreme poverty this year, raising the poverty rate to 9.3%.
Job creation has stagnated, the informal economy is shrinking, and global demand for Bangladeshi garments—the nation’s economic backbone—continues to decline. Income inequality is widening, and public trust in leadership is eroding. The July Movement’s original vision—justice, reform, and national renewal—is in danger of being lost in a mire of internal conflict, bureaucratic inertia, and political brinkmanship.
BNP leaders warn that elements of the Awami League—though officially dismantled—may be exploiting this period of chaos to regain influence. As Tarique Rahman’s return nears, the BNP is preparing to push back against what it describes as orchestrated “false propaganda,” aiming to reassert public confidence through broad-based engagement.
Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture. With the memory of the July Uprising still vivid in the national psyche, the choices made in the coming weeks may determine whether the country fulfils the promise of democratic renewal—or collapses once more under the weight of old rivalries and unfinished battles.
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As the historic month of August draws near, a rising wave of unease is sweeping across Bangladesh. This anxiety is not without reason.
Recent developments, along with a report published in a vernacular daily, allege that ousted leaders of the banned Awami League are planning to incite unrest during this politically sensitive month—one closely associated with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
Speaking to The Bangladesh Express, several political analysts warned that Bangladesh may be heading toward heightened instability due to three major political developments: the anticipated announcement of the long-awaited national election schedule; the reported return of BNP Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman after 15 years in exile; and mounting friction among political parties over key reform proposals that will ultimately require parliamentary approval.
Despite repeated appeals for unity from Dr Yunus, divisions remain stark among the parties that coalesced around the July Movement. These groups, once seen as standard-bearers of a post-Awami League future, are now fractured over key reform issues and increasingly hostile towards one another. The resulting rift is placing growing strain on an already brittle consensus.
Tensions reached a new high following a report in Amar Desh alleging that former Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal—now based in India—is actively mobilising forces to spark unrest during August. The report claimed that groups are being trained in Dhaka’s Bashundhara area and are preparing to cross the border to carry out coordinated disruption. This comes in the wake of last year’s events, when enraged demonstrators demolished the historic house at Dhanmondi 32, the former residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
These developments have fuelled growing public anxiety, as thousands of people—including teachers, women, and workers—take to the streets with a range of demands. In the capital, even passenger stoppages are crowded with so-called deprived groups rallying to press their grievances. Hopes for a peaceful democratic transition are now increasingly clouded by fears of confrontation and unrest.
Yet, the spectre of street clashes looms large. Many fear that if Awami League loyalists launch mass mobilisation in August—while July Movement supporters remain active and agitated groups continue to gather in the capital—the situation could spiral into violent conflict, potentially prompting military intervention.
Concerns are growing over the interim government's inability to maintain law and order, further exacerbated by high-profile incidents like the broad-daylight murder of a businessman in Mitford, unrest in Gopalganj, and attacks on NCP leaders.
Extortion, rent-seeking, and organised theft continue to disrupt business activity, fuelling further discontent. Political coherence remains elusive. BNP and Jamaat are entangled in internal rivalries, while the Jatiya Party—viewed by many as a former Awami League collaborator—has become politically marginalised. Veteran left-wing leaders warn that if trained AL activists flood the streets, the resulting confrontations could edge the country closer to civil war.
Meanwhile, key reforms promised by the interim administration have largely stalled. Of the 11 reform commissions set up after the July Uprising—addressing electoral laws, the constitution, the judiciary, policing, and public administration—only four have submitted reports, none of which have been implemented. A broader consultative process, once promised to include students, civil society, political parties, and officials, has yet to materialise. This vacuum risks undermining the tenuous consensus achieved in the aftermath of July.
Official claims of stability appear increasingly out of touch with reality. Crime data from January 2025 paint a stark picture: 294 murders and 105 abductions were recorded—the worst monthly figures in six years. Civil unrest is expanding beyond the political realm. Student demonstrations, garment worker strikes, and protests by professionals have all surged. In one recent incident, autorickshaw drivers shut down Banani for six hours, prompting a rare and alarming deployment of army troops.
The economic outlook is equally bleak. Spiralling inflation has sharply reduced household purchasing power. Government studies show food distribution via public channels has dropped 7% year-on-year, even as prices for staples like rice and lentils continue to rise. While the World Bank has reported a narrowing current account deficit, fiscal pressures remain high. Revenue shortfalls and ballooning subsidies threaten long-term stability. More alarmingly, nearly three million people are projected to fall into extreme poverty this year, raising the poverty rate to 9.3%.
Job creation has stagnated, the informal economy is shrinking, and global demand for Bangladeshi garments—the nation’s economic backbone—continues to decline. Income inequality is widening, and public trust in leadership is eroding. The July Movement’s original vision—justice, reform, and national renewal—is in danger of being lost in a mire of internal conflict, bureaucratic inertia, and political brinkmanship.
BNP leaders warn that elements of the Awami League—though officially dismantled—may be exploiting this period of chaos to regain influence. As Tarique Rahman’s return nears, the BNP is preparing to push back against what it describes as orchestrated “false propaganda,” aiming to reassert public confidence through broad-based engagement.
Bangladesh stands at a critical juncture. With the memory of the July Uprising still vivid in the national psyche, the choices made in the coming weeks may determine whether the country fulfils the promise of democratic renewal—or collapses once more under the weight of old rivalries and unfinished battles.
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