Tuesday, 23 December, 2025
Geography makes neighbours; diplomacy makes partners. Yet today, relations between Bangladesh and India are being shaped less by partnership than by suspicion, mistrust and steadily hardening rhetoric.
With tensions at their sharpest point in years, Russia’s ambassador to Dhaka, Alexander G Khozin, intervened on Monday with a rare public call for de-escalation. Stressing the urgency of regional stability ahead of Bangladesh’s national election, his warning reflected growing international concern that the crisis could spiral beyond the control of Dhaka and Delhi.
The depth of the rupture is striking, given the shared history that once bound the two countries. India was a pivotal ally in Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971—a legacy often cited to justify a “special relationship”. But history alone cannot sustain diplomacy. Since 1975, bilateral ties have swung between cooperation and confrontation, a volatility many analysts attribute to New Delhi’s long-standing political investment in a single force in Dhaka: the now-banned Bangladesh Awami League (BAL).
That alignment collapsed dramatically after former prime minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India following a mass uprising last year. New Delhi’s decision to grant her shelter—and its refusal to respond to Dhaka’s extradition request—ignited widespread anger in Bangladesh, intensifying long-standing grievances over border killings, unresolved river disputes and perceived political interference.
The situation deteriorated further after the killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, convener of Inqilab Moncho, who was shot dead in broad daylight on a busy Dhaka street on December 12. Speculation—still unverified—that the assailant fled to India prompted Bangladesh to summon India’s High Commissioner, urging the arrest and extradition of any suspects who may have crossed the border. Dhaka also protested what it described as provocative political statements made by Sheikh Hasina from Delhi.
India rejected the allegations outright. Its foreign ministry insisted that Indian territory has never been used for activities against Bangladesh, dismissing the claims as baseless. But the exchange further eroded trust, pushing the relationship to what many now describe as a boiling point.
Despite the warning from Moscow, de-escalation has proved elusive. Rhetoric hardened on both sides after remarks by a Bangladeshi political leader suggesting that India’s northeastern “Seven Sisters” could face isolation if Bangladesh were destabilised. New Delhi reacted sharply, summoning Bangladesh’s High Commissioner and warning against any threat to India’s territorial integrity.
Diplomatic tit-for-tat soon followed. India temporarily shut visa centres in several Bangladeshi cities citing security concerns, while Bangladesh suspended consular services at its high commission in Delhi after protests left its envoy feeling threatened. Although some services were later restored, the signal was unmistakable: diplomacy was giving way to pressure.
Attack on Agartala Bangladesh mission 'pre-planned': Bangladesh govt
Beneath the public exchanges lies a deeper rupture that began on August 5 last year, when Sheikh Hasina’s government collapsed after 17 years in power. For New Delhi, the sudden emergence of an interim government led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus represents its most unpredictable neighbour since 1971. An Indian parliamentary committee recently described Bangladesh’s political shift as India’s “greatest strategic challenge” in decades, urging a recalibration of policy. Yet developments on the ground suggest rigidity, not adaptation.
India’s response has extended well beyond diplomatic messaging. Trade restrictions, tightened border controls and logistical bottlenecks have hit Bangladeshi exporters—particularly small and medium-sized enterprises reliant on land ports. The imbalance is stark: Bangladesh imports nearly six times more from India than it exports, ensuring that any disruption disproportionately harms Dhaka.
Energy dependence further deepens vulnerability. Roughly 17 per cent of Bangladesh’s electricity supply comes from India. Any prolonged disruption would have immediate and serious consequences for industry and urban life.
Strategic unease compounds the tension. Over the past decade, India has encircled Bangladesh with an expanding web of roads, railways and waterways linking its northeast to the mainland. Dhaka’s moves to revive Lalmonirhat airport and assert its importance as India’s “only route to the sea” have unsettled Delhi, particularly given sensitivities surrounding the Siliguri Corridor.
At the same time, India is navigating a more complex global environment. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s return to power with a reduced mandate, alongside mounting international scrutiny over democratic backsliding, has left New Delhi more defensive. That defensiveness appears increasingly visible in its Bangladesh policy.
For Dhaka, the stakes are just as high. Delivering a credible national election remains the interim government’s overriding priority. Any external distraction risks destabilising the process and undermining confidence among international partners watching closely. While public anger towards India is real—and often rooted in legitimate historical grievances—allowing emotion to dictate policy would be strategically self-defeating.
Business leaders are already sounding the alarm. Political disputes, they argue, should not be allowed to choke economic lifelines. Geography cannot be negotiated away. India is Bangladesh’s largest neighbour and an emerging economic power from which Dhaka still stands to gain—if relations are managed with restraint.
Calls to shut down the Indian High Commission, expel diplomats or threaten India’s territorial unity may satisfy momentary outrage, but they carry severe diplomatic costs. Such rhetoric risks reinforcing hostile narratives in India and damaging Bangladesh’s standing internationally. No fugitive can be returned, and no grievance resolved, through confrontation alone.
The hard truth is this: neither country benefits from escalation. A relationship driven by pressure, retaliation and public posturing will only deepen mistrust and inflict economic damage on both sides—though Bangladesh would bear the heavier burden.
What is needed now is political will. Dhaka must pursue its legitimate demands—justice, non-interference and reciprocity—through disciplined diplomacy, not incendiary rhetoric. New Delhi, for its part, must recognise that Bangladesh’s political landscape has changed irrevocably. Engagement can no longer be filtered through the prism of deposed allies.
Delhi and Dhaka must dial down the heat. Dialogue, however difficult, remains the only viable path forward. When neighbours choose restraint over reaction, borders can once again become bridges rather than battlegrounds.
Comments
Geography makes neighbours; diplomacy makes partners. Yet today, relations between Bangladesh and India are being shaped less by partnership than by suspicion, mistrust and steadily hardening rhetoric.
With tensions at their sharpest point in years, Russia’s ambassador to Dhaka, Alexander G Khozin, intervened on Monday with a rare public call for de-escalation. Stressing the urgency of regional stability ahead of Bangladesh’s national election, his warning reflected growing international concern that the crisis could spiral beyond the control of Dhaka and Delhi.
The depth of the rupture is striking, given the shared history that once bound the two countries. India was a pivotal ally in Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971—a legacy often cited to justify a “special relationship”. But history alone cannot sustain diplomacy. Since 1975, bilateral ties have swung between cooperation and confrontation, a volatility many analysts attribute to New Delhi’s long-standing political investment in a single force in Dhaka: the now-banned Bangladesh Awami League (BAL).
That alignment collapsed dramatically after former prime minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India following a mass uprising last year. New Delhi’s decision to grant her shelter—and its refusal to respond to Dhaka’s extradition request—ignited widespread anger in Bangladesh, intensifying long-standing grievances over border killings, unresolved river disputes and perceived political interference.
The situation deteriorated further after the killing of Sharif Osman Hadi, convener of Inqilab Moncho, who was shot dead in broad daylight on a busy Dhaka street on December 12. Speculation—still unverified—that the assailant fled to India prompted Bangladesh to summon India’s High Commissioner, urging the arrest and extradition of any suspects who may have crossed the border. Dhaka also protested what it described as provocative political statements made by Sheikh Hasina from Delhi.
India rejected the allegations outright. Its foreign ministry insisted that Indian territory has never been used for activities against Bangladesh, dismissing the claims as baseless. But the exchange further eroded trust, pushing the relationship to what many now describe as a boiling point.
Despite the warning from Moscow, de-escalation has proved elusive. Rhetoric hardened on both sides after remarks by a Bangladeshi political leader suggesting that India’s northeastern “Seven Sisters” could face isolation if Bangladesh were destabilised. New Delhi reacted sharply, summoning Bangladesh’s High Commissioner and warning against any threat to India’s territorial integrity.
Diplomatic tit-for-tat soon followed. India temporarily shut visa centres in several Bangladeshi cities citing security concerns, while Bangladesh suspended consular services at its high commission in Delhi after protests left its envoy feeling threatened. Although some services were later restored, the signal was unmistakable: diplomacy was giving way to pressure.
Attack on Agartala Bangladesh mission 'pre-planned': Bangladesh govt
Beneath the public exchanges lies a deeper rupture that began on August 5 last year, when Sheikh Hasina’s government collapsed after 17 years in power. For New Delhi, the sudden emergence of an interim government led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus represents its most unpredictable neighbour since 1971. An Indian parliamentary committee recently described Bangladesh’s political shift as India’s “greatest strategic challenge” in decades, urging a recalibration of policy. Yet developments on the ground suggest rigidity, not adaptation.
India’s response has extended well beyond diplomatic messaging. Trade restrictions, tightened border controls and logistical bottlenecks have hit Bangladeshi exporters—particularly small and medium-sized enterprises reliant on land ports. The imbalance is stark: Bangladesh imports nearly six times more from India than it exports, ensuring that any disruption disproportionately harms Dhaka.
Energy dependence further deepens vulnerability. Roughly 17 per cent of Bangladesh’s electricity supply comes from India. Any prolonged disruption would have immediate and serious consequences for industry and urban life.
Strategic unease compounds the tension. Over the past decade, India has encircled Bangladesh with an expanding web of roads, railways and waterways linking its northeast to the mainland. Dhaka’s moves to revive Lalmonirhat airport and assert its importance as India’s “only route to the sea” have unsettled Delhi, particularly given sensitivities surrounding the Siliguri Corridor.
At the same time, India is navigating a more complex global environment. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s return to power with a reduced mandate, alongside mounting international scrutiny over democratic backsliding, has left New Delhi more defensive. That defensiveness appears increasingly visible in its Bangladesh policy.
For Dhaka, the stakes are just as high. Delivering a credible national election remains the interim government’s overriding priority. Any external distraction risks destabilising the process and undermining confidence among international partners watching closely. While public anger towards India is real—and often rooted in legitimate historical grievances—allowing emotion to dictate policy would be strategically self-defeating.
Business leaders are already sounding the alarm. Political disputes, they argue, should not be allowed to choke economic lifelines. Geography cannot be negotiated away. India is Bangladesh’s largest neighbour and an emerging economic power from which Dhaka still stands to gain—if relations are managed with restraint.
Calls to shut down the Indian High Commission, expel diplomats or threaten India’s territorial unity may satisfy momentary outrage, but they carry severe diplomatic costs. Such rhetoric risks reinforcing hostile narratives in India and damaging Bangladesh’s standing internationally. No fugitive can be returned, and no grievance resolved, through confrontation alone.
The hard truth is this: neither country benefits from escalation. A relationship driven by pressure, retaliation and public posturing will only deepen mistrust and inflict economic damage on both sides—though Bangladesh would bear the heavier burden.
What is needed now is political will. Dhaka must pursue its legitimate demands—justice, non-interference and reciprocity—through disciplined diplomacy, not incendiary rhetoric. New Delhi, for its part, must recognise that Bangladesh’s political landscape has changed irrevocably. Engagement can no longer be filtered through the prism of deposed allies.
Delhi and Dhaka must dial down the heat. Dialogue, however difficult, remains the only viable path forward. When neighbours choose restraint over reaction, borders can once again become bridges rather than battlegrounds.
Comments
