
As Bangladesh hurtles toward its national election and referendum on 12 February, the political atmosphere is charged with anxiety over potential “election engineering.” Memories of past manipulations—particularly under the banned Awami League regimes—still haunt voters, prompting a persistent, unsettling question: “Will there even be a fair election?”
While no one can answer definitively, Lieutenant General Md Jahangir Alam Chowdhury (retd.), Adviser to the Ministries of Home Affairs and Agriculture, has vowed a free and fair process. Nearly one million security personnel—the largest deployment since independence—have been mobilised. On Sunday, he instructed all officials to strictly prevent any threat to public order, declaring: “There will be no compromise on law and order in the JS elections. The highest professionalism must be displayed to ensure citizen safety before, during, and after the polls.”
Yet the spectre of election engineering is being raised loudly by multiple parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami, the Jatiya Party, and the Revolutionary Workers Party. On 7 February, the BNP formally aired its concerns. Spokesperson Mahdi Amin, speaking in Lakshmipur, accused rivals of ballot manipulation and warned against the exploitation of religious sentiment for fraudulent votes. Dhaka-11 candidate MA Quayum cited risks of vote tampering, while senior figures Mirza Abbas and Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury evoked the haunting precedent of past elections. “If we fear election engineering, no one will remain unscathed,” warned Chapainawabganj-3 candidate Harunur Rashid.
Leaders of the Jatiya Party and Revolutionary Workers Party echoed these anxieties. Secretary General Shameem Haider Patwary called for unified vigilance, while candidate Saiful Haque said BNP would counter any attempts to subvert the vote. BNP’s accusations implicitly targeted Jamaat, which vehemently denied them. Jamaat spokesperson Ahsanul Mahboob Zubair dismissed the claims as “baseless,” insisting the party had duly informed the Election Commission of potential threats.
Political analysts note that such pre-election suspicions arise from two intertwined causes. First, the interim government has historically avoided taking firm stances, often accommodating both major parties in appointments and policy decisions. Second, longstanding political strategy dictates that parties pre-emptively craft narratives of manipulation to justify potential defeats. Past elections suggest that few results are ever accepted without challenge, making mistrust an enduring feature of Bangladesh’s electoral landscape.
The legacy of the Awami League’s administration looms large. The 7 January 2024 election, dubbed the “Me and Dummy” poll, followed controversial elections in 2014 and 2018. In 2014, a BNP boycott left the Awami League to hold a one-sided vote; in 2018, allegations surfaced that ballot boxes had been pre-stuffed. The interim government’s commission of inquiry, reporting to the Chief Adviser on 12 January, traced systematic election manipulation back to post-2008 planning at the highest state levels. These past irregularities now shadow the February vote.
Beyond Bangladesh, the February elections carry regional significance. South Asia’s 2026 electoral calendar will follow Bangladesh, with Nepal’s general election on 5 March and India’s state elections in West Bengal and Assam between March and May. How Bangladesh conducts its vote will influence narratives, voter behaviour, and perceptions of legitimacy across the subcontinent.
Bangladesh’s elections also stand apart because of the unique political climate. The ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina remains in exile in India after a student-led uprising in August 2024 ended her fifteen-year rule. Her presence abroad continues to exert a catalytic influence, complicating Dhaka–Delhi relations and shaping domestic perceptions of residual regime power. Meanwhile, youth-led protests, economic hardship, religious extremism, and social polarization create a volatile backdrop for the ballot.
The stakes are stark. A BNP victory may signal continuity within the entrenched elite duopoly rather than systemic renewal. Gains by Jamaat-e-Islami could amplify religious mobilization in politics, while strong performance by the National Citizen Party (NCP) might indicate a shift from street activism to electoral influence, reflecting the legacy of the 2024 uprising. Each outcome will resonate across South Asia, offering lessons or warnings for Nepal and India, where youth-led and anti-establishment forces are similarly engaged.
In this tense, historic moment, Bangladesh’s election is far more than a domestic exercise in democracy. It is a test of institutional integrity, a barometer of regional political trends, and a crucible for the nation’s trust in the electoral process. Haunted by past manipulations, the country approaches February 12 with both hope and apprehension—a moment when history and the present collide, and the shadow of the past threatens to determine the shape of the future.
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As Bangladesh hurtles toward its national election and referendum on 12 February, the political atmosphere is charged with anxiety over potential “election engineering.” Memories of past manipulations—particularly under the banned Awami League regimes—still haunt voters, prompting a persistent, unsettling question: “Will there even be a fair election?”
While no one can answer definitively, Lieutenant General Md Jahangir Alam Chowdhury (retd.), Adviser to the Ministries of Home Affairs and Agriculture, has vowed a free and fair process. Nearly one million security personnel—the largest deployment since independence—have been mobilised. On Sunday, he instructed all officials to strictly prevent any threat to public order, declaring: “There will be no compromise on law and order in the JS elections. The highest professionalism must be displayed to ensure citizen safety before, during, and after the polls.”
Yet the spectre of election engineering is being raised loudly by multiple parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami, the Jatiya Party, and the Revolutionary Workers Party. On 7 February, the BNP formally aired its concerns. Spokesperson Mahdi Amin, speaking in Lakshmipur, accused rivals of ballot manipulation and warned against the exploitation of religious sentiment for fraudulent votes. Dhaka-11 candidate MA Quayum cited risks of vote tampering, while senior figures Mirza Abbas and Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury evoked the haunting precedent of past elections. “If we fear election engineering, no one will remain unscathed,” warned Chapainawabganj-3 candidate Harunur Rashid.
Leaders of the Jatiya Party and Revolutionary Workers Party echoed these anxieties. Secretary General Shameem Haider Patwary called for unified vigilance, while candidate Saiful Haque said BNP would counter any attempts to subvert the vote. BNP’s accusations implicitly targeted Jamaat, which vehemently denied them. Jamaat spokesperson Ahsanul Mahboob Zubair dismissed the claims as “baseless,” insisting the party had duly informed the Election Commission of potential threats.
Political analysts note that such pre-election suspicions arise from two intertwined causes. First, the interim government has historically avoided taking firm stances, often accommodating both major parties in appointments and policy decisions. Second, longstanding political strategy dictates that parties pre-emptively craft narratives of manipulation to justify potential defeats. Past elections suggest that few results are ever accepted without challenge, making mistrust an enduring feature of Bangladesh’s electoral landscape.
The legacy of the Awami League’s administration looms large. The 7 January 2024 election, dubbed the “Me and Dummy” poll, followed controversial elections in 2014 and 2018. In 2014, a BNP boycott left the Awami League to hold a one-sided vote; in 2018, allegations surfaced that ballot boxes had been pre-stuffed. The interim government’s commission of inquiry, reporting to the Chief Adviser on 12 January, traced systematic election manipulation back to post-2008 planning at the highest state levels. These past irregularities now shadow the February vote.
Beyond Bangladesh, the February elections carry regional significance. South Asia’s 2026 electoral calendar will follow Bangladesh, with Nepal’s general election on 5 March and India’s state elections in West Bengal and Assam between March and May. How Bangladesh conducts its vote will influence narratives, voter behaviour, and perceptions of legitimacy across the subcontinent.
Bangladesh’s elections also stand apart because of the unique political climate. The ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina remains in exile in India after a student-led uprising in August 2024 ended her fifteen-year rule. Her presence abroad continues to exert a catalytic influence, complicating Dhaka–Delhi relations and shaping domestic perceptions of residual regime power. Meanwhile, youth-led protests, economic hardship, religious extremism, and social polarization create a volatile backdrop for the ballot.
The stakes are stark. A BNP victory may signal continuity within the entrenched elite duopoly rather than systemic renewal. Gains by Jamaat-e-Islami could amplify religious mobilization in politics, while strong performance by the National Citizen Party (NCP) might indicate a shift from street activism to electoral influence, reflecting the legacy of the 2024 uprising. Each outcome will resonate across South Asia, offering lessons or warnings for Nepal and India, where youth-led and anti-establishment forces are similarly engaged.
In this tense, historic moment, Bangladesh’s election is far more than a domestic exercise in democracy. It is a test of institutional integrity, a barometer of regional political trends, and a crucible for the nation’s trust in the electoral process. Haunted by past manipulations, the country approaches February 12 with both hope and apprehension—a moment when history and the present collide, and the shadow of the past threatens to determine the shape of the future.
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