Thursday, 01 January, 2026
As Bangladesh enters 2026, the country’s path remains uncertain. The final year of 2025 exposed deep-rooted administrative inefficiencies and economic stagnation, highlighting structural weaknesses that have long hindered progress. From the corridors of the secretariat to remote government offices, bureaucratic bottlenecks have multiplied, delaying critical decision-making and affecting the daily lives of millions.
A Year on Hold
Recent reports from the Daily Observer and regional analyses indicate that the nation has experienced a prolonged period of administrative inertia. Senior political figures and observers note that major government and business decisions have largely stalled as the country awaits national elections scheduled for February 2026. This “wait-and-see” approach has postponed essential investments, hampered trade, and slowed household economic choices, leaving the country’s growth on pause.
The bureaucracy’s lack of professionalism, compounded by politicisation, corruption, and poor governance, has been widely criticised. Decisions on promotions, postings, and resource allocation often bypass merit, seniority, or efficiency, further discouraging administrative dynamism.
Economic Frictions
Political unrest and administrative paralysis have translated into economic stagnation. The production sector faces mounting challenges due to power shortages, fuel constraints, high interest rates, and inadequate infrastructure, all of which have discouraged expansion.
Revenue collection has stagnated, with the government failing to meet targets for ten consecutive years. The interim government’s 2025–26 budget, smaller than its predecessor, signals a period of fiscal contraction rather than expansion.
Inflationary pressures, particularly in food prices, continue to erode household purchasing power. While foreign reserves have stabilised at $32.57 billion, export earnings fell 5.5% in November 2025, and the Annual Development Programme remains underutilised, with only 12.25% of allocations spent in the first five months. Analysts warn that these economic pressures, combined with administrative lethargy, could slow recovery and exacerbate social discontent.
Historical Context of Administrative Reform
Bangladesh’s struggle with administrative reform is longstanding. Since independence in 1971, over a dozen commissions—including the Civil Administration Restoration Committee (CAR, 1971), the Administrative Reorganisation Committee (ARC, 1993), and the Regulatory Reform Commission (RRC, 2007)—have proposed sweeping changes, yet most recommendations remained unimplemented due to political interference and bureaucratic resistance.
The post-war CAR focused on reconstructing a war-torn administration, but political turbulence limited its success. Subsequent efforts, from decentralisation initiatives in the ASRC (1972) to pay and service restructuring in the P&SC (1976), repeatedly stalled. Even intermittent reforms, such as judicial separation and regulatory simplification, failed to bring systemic change.
The Muyeed Commission: A New Hope?
Following the August 5, 2025 ousting of the Awami League government, the interim administration established the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) on October 3, chaired by Abdul Muyeed Chowdhury. Tasked with diagnosing longstanding inefficiencies, the commission produced over 200 recommendations in just four months, covering short-term (six months), medium-term (one year), and long-term reforms.
Key proposals include:
The commission’s survey revealed stark public perceptions: 84% of Bangladeshis believe the administration needs reform, 80% find government services unfriendly, and 64% feel officials behave like rulers rather than servants.
Dr Md Hafizur Rahman Bhuiyan, former additional secretary and commission member, stressed that the proposals were grounded in historical research rather than partisan interests. “If leaders prioritise the collective good over party interests, these reforms can succeed,” he said, cautioning that political will is critical.
Persistent Challenges
Experts identify two main barriers to reform: entrenched political reluctance and bureaucratic inertia. Without sustained leadership commitment, even the best-designed reforms are unlikely to materialise.
Professor Sadiq Hasan of Dhaka University notes: “Past governments sidelined reforms to protect partisan agendas, while bureaucrats resisted losing influence. The interim government may implement short-term fixes, but systemic transformation requires broader democratic legitimacy.”
The political landscape adds further uncertainty. With national elections looming, policymakers may hesitate to enact reforms that could provoke controversy or challenge entrenched interests. Critics warn that without genuine enforcement, the Muyeed Commission’s proposals risk becoming another in a long line of shelved reports.
A Glimmer of Optimism
Despite scepticism, some see potential for meaningful change. The interim government’s lack of partisan ties could allow bold steps previously avoided by elected administrations. Analysts argue that a transparent, merit-based implementation of the commission’s recommendations could modernise the civil service, improve service delivery, and enhance accountability—laying a stronger foundation for democratic governance.
“Reform isn’t just policy—it’s a process requiring political commitment, bureaucratic cooperation, and public engagement,” Professor Hasan observed. “Whether this opportunity is seized will define Bangladesh’s trajectory for years to come.”
As 2026 begins, the nation faces a pivotal moment: can it turn years of stagnation into an era of administrative efficiency and economic revival, or will historical patterns of inertia and partisan obstruction prevail? The Muyeed Commission’s report offers a roadmap, but the journey ahead will demand courage, vision, and decisive political will.
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As Bangladesh enters 2026, the country’s path remains uncertain. The final year of 2025 exposed deep-rooted administrative inefficiencies and economic stagnation, highlighting structural weaknesses that have long hindered progress. From the corridors of the secretariat to remote government offices, bureaucratic bottlenecks have multiplied, delaying critical decision-making and affecting the daily lives of millions.
A Year on Hold
Recent reports from the Daily Observer and regional analyses indicate that the nation has experienced a prolonged period of administrative inertia. Senior political figures and observers note that major government and business decisions have largely stalled as the country awaits national elections scheduled for February 2026. This “wait-and-see” approach has postponed essential investments, hampered trade, and slowed household economic choices, leaving the country’s growth on pause.
The bureaucracy’s lack of professionalism, compounded by politicisation, corruption, and poor governance, has been widely criticised. Decisions on promotions, postings, and resource allocation often bypass merit, seniority, or efficiency, further discouraging administrative dynamism.
Economic Frictions
Political unrest and administrative paralysis have translated into economic stagnation. The production sector faces mounting challenges due to power shortages, fuel constraints, high interest rates, and inadequate infrastructure, all of which have discouraged expansion.
Revenue collection has stagnated, with the government failing to meet targets for ten consecutive years. The interim government’s 2025–26 budget, smaller than its predecessor, signals a period of fiscal contraction rather than expansion.
Inflationary pressures, particularly in food prices, continue to erode household purchasing power. While foreign reserves have stabilised at $32.57 billion, export earnings fell 5.5% in November 2025, and the Annual Development Programme remains underutilised, with only 12.25% of allocations spent in the first five months. Analysts warn that these economic pressures, combined with administrative lethargy, could slow recovery and exacerbate social discontent.
Historical Context of Administrative Reform
Bangladesh’s struggle with administrative reform is longstanding. Since independence in 1971, over a dozen commissions—including the Civil Administration Restoration Committee (CAR, 1971), the Administrative Reorganisation Committee (ARC, 1993), and the Regulatory Reform Commission (RRC, 2007)—have proposed sweeping changes, yet most recommendations remained unimplemented due to political interference and bureaucratic resistance.
The post-war CAR focused on reconstructing a war-torn administration, but political turbulence limited its success. Subsequent efforts, from decentralisation initiatives in the ASRC (1972) to pay and service restructuring in the P&SC (1976), repeatedly stalled. Even intermittent reforms, such as judicial separation and regulatory simplification, failed to bring systemic change.
The Muyeed Commission: A New Hope?
Following the August 5, 2025 ousting of the Awami League government, the interim administration established the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) on October 3, chaired by Abdul Muyeed Chowdhury. Tasked with diagnosing longstanding inefficiencies, the commission produced over 200 recommendations in just four months, covering short-term (six months), medium-term (one year), and long-term reforms.
Key proposals include:
The commission’s survey revealed stark public perceptions: 84% of Bangladeshis believe the administration needs reform, 80% find government services unfriendly, and 64% feel officials behave like rulers rather than servants.
Dr Md Hafizur Rahman Bhuiyan, former additional secretary and commission member, stressed that the proposals were grounded in historical research rather than partisan interests. “If leaders prioritise the collective good over party interests, these reforms can succeed,” he said, cautioning that political will is critical.
Persistent Challenges
Experts identify two main barriers to reform: entrenched political reluctance and bureaucratic inertia. Without sustained leadership commitment, even the best-designed reforms are unlikely to materialise.
Professor Sadiq Hasan of Dhaka University notes: “Past governments sidelined reforms to protect partisan agendas, while bureaucrats resisted losing influence. The interim government may implement short-term fixes, but systemic transformation requires broader democratic legitimacy.”
The political landscape adds further uncertainty. With national elections looming, policymakers may hesitate to enact reforms that could provoke controversy or challenge entrenched interests. Critics warn that without genuine enforcement, the Muyeed Commission’s proposals risk becoming another in a long line of shelved reports.
A Glimmer of Optimism
Despite scepticism, some see potential for meaningful change. The interim government’s lack of partisan ties could allow bold steps previously avoided by elected administrations. Analysts argue that a transparent, merit-based implementation of the commission’s recommendations could modernise the civil service, improve service delivery, and enhance accountability—laying a stronger foundation for democratic governance.
“Reform isn’t just policy—it’s a process requiring political commitment, bureaucratic cooperation, and public engagement,” Professor Hasan observed. “Whether this opportunity is seized will define Bangladesh’s trajectory for years to come.”
As 2026 begins, the nation faces a pivotal moment: can it turn years of stagnation into an era of administrative efficiency and economic revival, or will historical patterns of inertia and partisan obstruction prevail? The Muyeed Commission’s report offers a roadmap, but the journey ahead will demand courage, vision, and decisive political will.
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