Tuesday, 07 October, 2025
The armed violence that convulsed Khagrachhari’s Guimara upazila on Saturday and Sunday- leaving at least three dead and dozens injured, including army and police personnel—has thrust the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) back into the national spotlight. Once dismissed as a fringe insurgent group, the UPDF now stands once again at the centre of a dangerous web of militancy, politics, and foreign influence that threatens to destabilise Bangladesh ahead of the national election in February 2026.
Security officials and government insiders contend that the unrest was not a spontaneous eruption but part of a coordinated plot involving remnants of the ousted Sheikh Hasina regime, UPDF leaders in the hills, and external actors in India who have long treated the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) as a pressure point against Dhaka. Their assessment draws on past incidents, the UPDF’s links to the ex-premier Hasina—now in exile in India—and the group’s connections across the border at a time when New Delhi itself faces new strategic pressures from shifting US military dynamics in South Asia.
Formed in 1998 after rejecting the CHT Peace Accord signed by Hasina’s government and PCJSS leader Santu Larma, the UPDF fractured into multiple factions—UPDF (Main), UPDF (Democratic), and UPDF (Progressive). Leaders such as Prasit Bikash Khisha, Shanti Dev Chakma, and Ukhanu Marma of the student affiliate Parbatya Chhatra Parishad (PCP) have been repeatedly accused of extortion, kidnappings, and violent attacks. Law enforcement sources estimate that UPDF factions collectively raise Tk 150–200 crore annually through illegal toll collection, smuggling, and cross-border trade. These funds, investigators allege, were partly laundered through front NGOs and local businesses in Rangamati and Khagrachhari—some of which operated under the quiet protection of Awami League leaders.
Throughout Sheikh Hasina’s rule, particularly after 2009, the UPDF operated in a political gray zone. Intelligence reports indicate that local Awami League figures—including former MP Kalparanjan Chakma and district-level party committees—struck backroom deals with UPDF operatives. These arrangements allegedly ensured “managed instability”: UPDF would weaken rival PCJSS factions loyal to Santu Larma, while Dhaka could justify continued militarisation of the CHT. More troublingly, Awami League insiders have suggested that millions in extortion proceeds from the CHT were funneled into AL coffers during election years, often laundered through contractors and transport syndicates tied to the ruling party. This created what one analyst described as a “symbiotic relationship”: UPDF violence was tolerated when politically convenient, while the group thrived under selective impunity.
India’s shadow looms large over this picture. The CHT, bordering Tripura and Mizoram, has long been strategically significant for New Delhi. During the insurgency years of the 1970s–90s, India sheltered PCJSS fighters; after the 1997 accord, its approach shifted to ensuring that the region remained under Dhaka’s control but not entirely pacified. Senior interim government officials now allege that Indian intelligence agencies maintained informal contacts with UPDF leaders such as Prasit Bikash Khisha, providing sanctuary and logistical support in Tripura safehouses. In exchange, Dhaka under Hasina is said to have made key concessions to New Delhi, including transit access and alignment with Indian security priorities. The current unrest, only months before a pivotal election, is therefore seen by many as part of a broader strategy: to pressure the Yunus-led interim administration, test its resilience, and keep Bangladesh firmly tied to India’s regional calculus.
The sequence of violence in September underscores the orchestrated nature of events. On September 19, the murder of motorcyclist Mamun sparked tensions. On September 23, the rape of a schoolgirl in Singinala led to protests, and the following day a UPDF (Main) suspect, Shayan Shil, was arrested. On September 24–25, UPDF affiliate Ukhanu Marma mobilised student groups under the banner “Jumma Chhatra Janata,” enforcing a half-day strike. By September 26–27, protesters were pelting stones at army patrols, UPDF-linked groups were firing on civilians, vandalising ambulances, and imposing road blockades. The violence reached its peak on September 28 in Guimara, where UPDF operatives reportedly fired 100–150 rounds from automatic weapons from hilltop positions, injuring soldiers, BGB personnel, and civilians. By evening, the army regained control, but not before homes were torched, vehicles vandalised, and fears of a communal riot spread across the district.
The Bangladesh Army has publicly framed the violence as part of a larger conspiracy—a calculated attempt to destabilise the interim administration and derail the electoral process. With Hasina in exile and the Awami League weakened, UPDF and allied groups have lost a key patron. But their ability to mobilise armed cadres, channel money through extortion and smuggling networks, and leverage foreign backing remains intact. For Bangladesh, the stark questions now are whether the Khagrachhari violence was simply rooted in local grievances over land and justice, or whether it was part of a political project to undermine the Yunus government; how deeply UPDF leaders like Prasit Bikash Khisha remain tied to ousted Awami League figures; and whether India is once again using the CHT as a lever in Dhaka’s politics.
The interim government faces a critical test. It must cut off UPDF’s financing networks by dismantling extortion rackets and NGO fronts, investigate Awami League–UPDF ties and potential money trails to Dhaka, and confront India diplomatically with a clear message that Bangladesh will not tolerate external destabilisation ahead of elections. The CHT has once again become a tinderbox, where local grievances, militant opportunism, and geopolitical rivalries converge. Whether the late September unrest remains a contained flashpoint or evolves into a broader campaign to derail democracy will depend on how decisively Dhaka acts in the crucial weeks ahead.
Comments
The armed violence that convulsed Khagrachhari’s Guimara upazila on Saturday and Sunday- leaving at least three dead and dozens injured, including army and police personnel—has thrust the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) back into the national spotlight. Once dismissed as a fringe insurgent group, the UPDF now stands once again at the centre of a dangerous web of militancy, politics, and foreign influence that threatens to destabilise Bangladesh ahead of the national election in February 2026.
Security officials and government insiders contend that the unrest was not a spontaneous eruption but part of a coordinated plot involving remnants of the ousted Sheikh Hasina regime, UPDF leaders in the hills, and external actors in India who have long treated the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) as a pressure point against Dhaka. Their assessment draws on past incidents, the UPDF’s links to the ex-premier Hasina—now in exile in India—and the group’s connections across the border at a time when New Delhi itself faces new strategic pressures from shifting US military dynamics in South Asia.
Formed in 1998 after rejecting the CHT Peace Accord signed by Hasina’s government and PCJSS leader Santu Larma, the UPDF fractured into multiple factions—UPDF (Main), UPDF (Democratic), and UPDF (Progressive). Leaders such as Prasit Bikash Khisha, Shanti Dev Chakma, and Ukhanu Marma of the student affiliate Parbatya Chhatra Parishad (PCP) have been repeatedly accused of extortion, kidnappings, and violent attacks. Law enforcement sources estimate that UPDF factions collectively raise Tk 150–200 crore annually through illegal toll collection, smuggling, and cross-border trade. These funds, investigators allege, were partly laundered through front NGOs and local businesses in Rangamati and Khagrachhari—some of which operated under the quiet protection of Awami League leaders.
Throughout Sheikh Hasina’s rule, particularly after 2009, the UPDF operated in a political gray zone. Intelligence reports indicate that local Awami League figures—including former MP Kalparanjan Chakma and district-level party committees—struck backroom deals with UPDF operatives. These arrangements allegedly ensured “managed instability”: UPDF would weaken rival PCJSS factions loyal to Santu Larma, while Dhaka could justify continued militarisation of the CHT. More troublingly, Awami League insiders have suggested that millions in extortion proceeds from the CHT were funneled into AL coffers during election years, often laundered through contractors and transport syndicates tied to the ruling party. This created what one analyst described as a “symbiotic relationship”: UPDF violence was tolerated when politically convenient, while the group thrived under selective impunity.
India’s shadow looms large over this picture. The CHT, bordering Tripura and Mizoram, has long been strategically significant for New Delhi. During the insurgency years of the 1970s–90s, India sheltered PCJSS fighters; after the 1997 accord, its approach shifted to ensuring that the region remained under Dhaka’s control but not entirely pacified. Senior interim government officials now allege that Indian intelligence agencies maintained informal contacts with UPDF leaders such as Prasit Bikash Khisha, providing sanctuary and logistical support in Tripura safehouses. In exchange, Dhaka under Hasina is said to have made key concessions to New Delhi, including transit access and alignment with Indian security priorities. The current unrest, only months before a pivotal election, is therefore seen by many as part of a broader strategy: to pressure the Yunus-led interim administration, test its resilience, and keep Bangladesh firmly tied to India’s regional calculus.
The sequence of violence in September underscores the orchestrated nature of events. On September 19, the murder of motorcyclist Mamun sparked tensions. On September 23, the rape of a schoolgirl in Singinala led to protests, and the following day a UPDF (Main) suspect, Shayan Shil, was arrested. On September 24–25, UPDF affiliate Ukhanu Marma mobilised student groups under the banner “Jumma Chhatra Janata,” enforcing a half-day strike. By September 26–27, protesters were pelting stones at army patrols, UPDF-linked groups were firing on civilians, vandalising ambulances, and imposing road blockades. The violence reached its peak on September 28 in Guimara, where UPDF operatives reportedly fired 100–150 rounds from automatic weapons from hilltop positions, injuring soldiers, BGB personnel, and civilians. By evening, the army regained control, but not before homes were torched, vehicles vandalised, and fears of a communal riot spread across the district.
The Bangladesh Army has publicly framed the violence as part of a larger conspiracy—a calculated attempt to destabilise the interim administration and derail the electoral process. With Hasina in exile and the Awami League weakened, UPDF and allied groups have lost a key patron. But their ability to mobilise armed cadres, channel money through extortion and smuggling networks, and leverage foreign backing remains intact. For Bangladesh, the stark questions now are whether the Khagrachhari violence was simply rooted in local grievances over land and justice, or whether it was part of a political project to undermine the Yunus government; how deeply UPDF leaders like Prasit Bikash Khisha remain tied to ousted Awami League figures; and whether India is once again using the CHT as a lever in Dhaka’s politics.
The interim government faces a critical test. It must cut off UPDF’s financing networks by dismantling extortion rackets and NGO fronts, investigate Awami League–UPDF ties and potential money trails to Dhaka, and confront India diplomatically with a clear message that Bangladesh will not tolerate external destabilisation ahead of elections. The CHT has once again become a tinderbox, where local grievances, militant opportunism, and geopolitical rivalries converge. Whether the late September unrest remains a contained flashpoint or evolves into a broader campaign to derail democracy will depend on how decisively Dhaka acts in the crucial weeks ahead.
Comments
