Wednesday, 01 October, 2025
The violence that engulfed Khagrachhari’s Guimara upazila on Saturday and Sunday, leaving at least three dead and dozens injured—including members of the army and police—has sent shockwaves through Dhaka.
Both the Home Ministry and Bangladesh Army have described the attacks as far more than a spontaneous eruption of local anger, warning that the events reflect a deliberate effort to destabilise the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and, by extension, Bangladesh’s fragile political transition.
The immediate trigger was the September 23 rape case in Singinala and the arrest of a United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF–Main) suspect. Yet officials and security analysts insist the unrest cannot be seen in isolation. It appears intertwined with militant factions in the hills, the ousted Awami League under Sheikh Hasina, and India’s enduring strategic ambitions along Bangladesh’s eastern frontier.
In an unusually coordinated stance, both the Home Ministry and Army described the Khagrachhari violence as a planned campaign rather than spontaneous disorder. Army reports indicate UPDF operatives fired automatic weapons from elevated positions, targeting both security personnel and civilians.
The Home Ministry warned of “deliberate destabilisation” and pledged to identify and prosecute those responsible, signalling networks that stretch far beyond the hill districts.
“UPDF’s involvement is not limited to local grievances,” a senior security source told The Bangladesh Express. “There are clear signs of orchestration, backed by political patrons and external encouragement.”
The UPDF, formed in 1998 to oppose the CHT Peace Accord, has long been known for extortion, arms smuggling, and fomenting communal tension. But its political significance has often been underestimated. Security officials now allege that during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, elements of the group were quietly tolerated—and sometimes actively encouraged—to keep the region volatile.
By undermining rival factions such as the PCJSS (Santu Larma) and portraying the hills as unstable, Hasina’s government justified militarisation while maintaining leverage over local actors. Several UPDF-linked NGOs and student organisations were allowed to operate with surprising freedom despite their militant connections.
Now, with Hasina removed from power and living under Indian protection, the group’s re-emergence is seen by security circles as part of a broader, sinister strategy. The unrest may simultaneously serve to bolster a weakened Awami League and advance New Delhi’s long-standing interests in the region, which it has always viewed as strategically critical.
India’s shadow over the CHT is neither incidental nor recent. With borders adjoining Tripura and Mizoram, the hills have long been a zone of Indian concern. During the insurgency years, New Delhi openly supported the PCJSS and, according to analysts, never abandoned informal ties to splinter factions like the UPDF. Interim government sources claim that India continues to cultivate these links as leverage, ensuring Dhaka’s alignment with its security and economic agenda.
The timing of the Khagrachhari violence, just months ahead of Bangladesh’s national election in February 2026, has deepened suspicion that foreign influence and domestic political manipulation are at play.
The escalation followed a familiar but dangerous trajectory. The September 19 killing of a motorcyclist ignited tensions, followed by the September 23 rape case, which triggered protests and strikes orchestrated by UPDF-linked groups. By September 26, demonstrators were throwing stones at army patrols.
On the 27th and 28th, the situation erupted into full-blown armed clashes: gunfire from hilltop positions, ambulances vandalised, roads blockaded, homes torched, and civilians trapped in the crossfire. Army and Border Guard Bangladesh reinforcements eventually restored order, but not before fears of wider communal violence spread across the district.
For the interim government, Khagrachhari has become a critical test. Authorities must restore stability without inflaming ethnic divisions, unmask and prosecute the political backers of the unrest, and reassure voters and the international community that the February 2026 elections will proceed as planned.
Whether the UPDF’s resurgence is a bid for survival, political observers see it as a proxy move by the ousted Awami League, or a manifestation of India tightening its grip, the stakes are unmistakably high.
As a senior army officer bluntly observed, “The hills are no longer just about local disputes. What we are seeing is an attempt to reopen old wounds to weaken Bangladesh at a critical moment.”
The Chittagong Hill Tracts, once again, have become the epicentre of the nation’s stability—and perhaps its sovereignty.
Comments
The violence that engulfed Khagrachhari’s Guimara upazila on Saturday and Sunday, leaving at least three dead and dozens injured—including members of the army and police—has sent shockwaves through Dhaka.
Both the Home Ministry and Bangladesh Army have described the attacks as far more than a spontaneous eruption of local anger, warning that the events reflect a deliberate effort to destabilise the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and, by extension, Bangladesh’s fragile political transition.
The immediate trigger was the September 23 rape case in Singinala and the arrest of a United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF–Main) suspect. Yet officials and security analysts insist the unrest cannot be seen in isolation. It appears intertwined with militant factions in the hills, the ousted Awami League under Sheikh Hasina, and India’s enduring strategic ambitions along Bangladesh’s eastern frontier.
In an unusually coordinated stance, both the Home Ministry and Army described the Khagrachhari violence as a planned campaign rather than spontaneous disorder. Army reports indicate UPDF operatives fired automatic weapons from elevated positions, targeting both security personnel and civilians.
The Home Ministry warned of “deliberate destabilisation” and pledged to identify and prosecute those responsible, signalling networks that stretch far beyond the hill districts.
“UPDF’s involvement is not limited to local grievances,” a senior security source told The Bangladesh Express. “There are clear signs of orchestration, backed by political patrons and external encouragement.”
The UPDF, formed in 1998 to oppose the CHT Peace Accord, has long been known for extortion, arms smuggling, and fomenting communal tension. But its political significance has often been underestimated. Security officials now allege that during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, elements of the group were quietly tolerated—and sometimes actively encouraged—to keep the region volatile.
By undermining rival factions such as the PCJSS (Santu Larma) and portraying the hills as unstable, Hasina’s government justified militarisation while maintaining leverage over local actors. Several UPDF-linked NGOs and student organisations were allowed to operate with surprising freedom despite their militant connections.
Now, with Hasina removed from power and living under Indian protection, the group’s re-emergence is seen by security circles as part of a broader, sinister strategy. The unrest may simultaneously serve to bolster a weakened Awami League and advance New Delhi’s long-standing interests in the region, which it has always viewed as strategically critical.
India’s shadow over the CHT is neither incidental nor recent. With borders adjoining Tripura and Mizoram, the hills have long been a zone of Indian concern. During the insurgency years, New Delhi openly supported the PCJSS and, according to analysts, never abandoned informal ties to splinter factions like the UPDF. Interim government sources claim that India continues to cultivate these links as leverage, ensuring Dhaka’s alignment with its security and economic agenda.
The timing of the Khagrachhari violence, just months ahead of Bangladesh’s national election in February 2026, has deepened suspicion that foreign influence and domestic political manipulation are at play.
The escalation followed a familiar but dangerous trajectory. The September 19 killing of a motorcyclist ignited tensions, followed by the September 23 rape case, which triggered protests and strikes orchestrated by UPDF-linked groups. By September 26, demonstrators were throwing stones at army patrols.
On the 27th and 28th, the situation erupted into full-blown armed clashes: gunfire from hilltop positions, ambulances vandalised, roads blockaded, homes torched, and civilians trapped in the crossfire. Army and Border Guard Bangladesh reinforcements eventually restored order, but not before fears of wider communal violence spread across the district.
For the interim government, Khagrachhari has become a critical test. Authorities must restore stability without inflaming ethnic divisions, unmask and prosecute the political backers of the unrest, and reassure voters and the international community that the February 2026 elections will proceed as planned.
Whether the UPDF’s resurgence is a bid for survival, political observers see it as a proxy move by the ousted Awami League, or a manifestation of India tightening its grip, the stakes are unmistakably high.
As a senior army officer bluntly observed, “The hills are no longer just about local disputes. What we are seeing is an attempt to reopen old wounds to weaken Bangladesh at a critical moment.”
The Chittagong Hill Tracts, once again, have become the epicentre of the nation’s stability—and perhaps its sovereignty.
Comments
