As Bangladesh prepares for its 13th national election, scheduled for February, uncertainty continues to loom large. Yet two crucial questions continue to haunt the public—who have lived through 29 military interventions since independence—and political analysts, long witnesses to Bangladesh’s recurring cycles of murky politics.
What if the nation once again fails to achieve political consensus? And what if February’s election, hailed as a pathway back to democracy, instead crumbles under mistrust, boycotts, and unrest?
These questions hang heavily over a nation preparing for its 13th general election, even as the interim government insists it will hand over power to an elected administration by February. Speaking to THE BANGLADESH EXPRESS, journalists, doctors, traders, and residents in Dhaka voiced fears that the credibility of the polls remains in question.
These concerns are not unfounded. Bangladesh’s post-independence political history has been marred by military interventions, abrupt changes of government, and protracted instability. Since the first coup in 1975, the country has witnessed nearly 29 attempts at military takeovers. Against this turbulent backdrop, scepticism about the ability of the current interim arrangement to deliver a credible election is hardly surprising.
The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, has repeatedly assured the nation that power will be handed over to an elected administration following its reform process. Yet, despite such reassurances, doubts persist across the political spectrum, civil society, and ordinary citizens.
Dr Yunus, despite his international stature, has struggled to forge consensus among the major political forces. His reliance on the army for maintaining law and order, coupled with lingering criticism of his business dealings, has only intensified scrutiny. Streets remain tense with protests, economic grievances, and frustrations over stalled development. The interim government’s reform agenda has also yet to be finalised, with political parties split over core issues such as the proposed proportional representation (PR) system and several contentious provisions in the July Charter.
The Commission, under Vice-Chairman Ali Riaz, has scheduled further consultations with parties. The draft Charter, which seeks implementation through constitutional and legal means, is pitched as the product of an inclusive process. But BNP, widely considered the frontrunner if elections are held, has rejected several key elements. Its acting chairman has warned supporters to be vigilant against conspiracies to derail democracy, while also portraying the coming election as the toughest in the nation’s history. Jamaat-e-Islami and other smaller parties, meanwhile, are pressing for the PR system, a proposal BNP has outright dismissed as impractical.
This stalemate raises a troubling prospect: what if consensus is not reached and boycotts ensue? Bangladesh has seen before how one-sided polls fuel crisis and invite intervention. The open address by Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman during the Janmashtami procession, where he emphasised the military’s commitment to harmony and national stability, has been interpreted in some circles as a reassuring gesture. Yet, for others, it was a reminder that the armed forces remain an ever-present factor in moments of political breakdown. The speculation of another intervention—however remote—cannot be dismissed if unrest escalates.
Complicating matters further is the revival of campus politics. After years of dormancy, central student union elections are expected at Dhaka University and other campuses. This resurgence has given Jamaat’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, fresh momentum, raising fears that confrontations in universities could spill over into national politics. Given that student movements have historically ignited larger political upheavals in Bangladesh, any violent turn on campuses could destabilise the pre-election environment.
The shadow of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina also looms. Forced into exile after mass protests toppled her 16-year rule, she has resurfaced in India, where reports suggest she is reorganising her party. Her ouster was driven by allegations of corruption, authoritarianism, and controversial elections devoid of voter participation. Yet her continuing influence, especially among segments of the Awami League, adds another unpredictable element to the political equation.
All of this plays out against a backdrop of economic fragility. Inflation remains high, the tax-to-GDP ratio one of the lowest in the region, and governance indicators among the weakest globally. Bangladesh ranks 108th in the Property Rights Index and 127th in the Economic Freedom Index, reflecting structural flaws that have long deterred investment and hindered growth. Public frustration is rising as living costs climb and reforms appear stalled.
At the same time, labour migration and remittances continue to provide a lifeline. They bolster GDP, stabilise foreign reserves, and sustain millions of households. Yet, even this vital sector faces challenges from high costs, exploitation, and reliance on informal channels. Without reform, this too could falter. Economic anxiety, if combined with political unrest, could further erode confidence in the democratic process.
What then lies ahead? In the best-case scenario, parties will compromise, the interim government will complete its reforms, and February’s polls will mark a new chapter of stability. A credible election could unlock much-needed political calm, attract investment, and set the country back on a path of growth. The alternative is more unsettling: boycotts, violent protests, or worse, a breakdown that invites another era of military dominance.
Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. Its people are weary of autocracy, corruption, and instability. They want a credible election and an accountable government that can deliver both economic opportunity and political peace. But that outcome depends less on promises from the interim administration and more on the willingness of political actors to compromise in the national interest.
For now, uncertainty reigns. The critical question remains: will the political deadlock be broken in time to ensure that February’s election restores democracy, or will it mark yet another missed opportunity in the nation’s troubled history?
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As Bangladesh prepares for its 13th national election, scheduled for February, uncertainty continues to loom large. Yet two crucial questions continue to haunt the public—who have lived through 29 military interventions since independence—and political analysts, long witnesses to Bangladesh’s recurring cycles of murky politics.
What if the nation once again fails to achieve political consensus? And what if February’s election, hailed as a pathway back to democracy, instead crumbles under mistrust, boycotts, and unrest?
These questions hang heavily over a nation preparing for its 13th general election, even as the interim government insists it will hand over power to an elected administration by February. Speaking to THE BANGLADESH EXPRESS, journalists, doctors, traders, and residents in Dhaka voiced fears that the credibility of the polls remains in question.
These concerns are not unfounded. Bangladesh’s post-independence political history has been marred by military interventions, abrupt changes of government, and protracted instability. Since the first coup in 1975, the country has witnessed nearly 29 attempts at military takeovers. Against this turbulent backdrop, scepticism about the ability of the current interim arrangement to deliver a credible election is hardly surprising.
The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, has repeatedly assured the nation that power will be handed over to an elected administration following its reform process. Yet, despite such reassurances, doubts persist across the political spectrum, civil society, and ordinary citizens.
Dr Yunus, despite his international stature, has struggled to forge consensus among the major political forces. His reliance on the army for maintaining law and order, coupled with lingering criticism of his business dealings, has only intensified scrutiny. Streets remain tense with protests, economic grievances, and frustrations over stalled development. The interim government’s reform agenda has also yet to be finalised, with political parties split over core issues such as the proposed proportional representation (PR) system and several contentious provisions in the July Charter.
The Commission, under Vice-Chairman Ali Riaz, has scheduled further consultations with parties. The draft Charter, which seeks implementation through constitutional and legal means, is pitched as the product of an inclusive process. But BNP, widely considered the frontrunner if elections are held, has rejected several key elements. Its acting chairman has warned supporters to be vigilant against conspiracies to derail democracy, while also portraying the coming election as the toughest in the nation’s history. Jamaat-e-Islami and other smaller parties, meanwhile, are pressing for the PR system, a proposal BNP has outright dismissed as impractical.
This stalemate raises a troubling prospect: what if consensus is not reached and boycotts ensue? Bangladesh has seen before how one-sided polls fuel crisis and invite intervention. The open address by Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman during the Janmashtami procession, where he emphasised the military’s commitment to harmony and national stability, has been interpreted in some circles as a reassuring gesture. Yet, for others, it was a reminder that the armed forces remain an ever-present factor in moments of political breakdown. The speculation of another intervention—however remote—cannot be dismissed if unrest escalates.
Complicating matters further is the revival of campus politics. After years of dormancy, central student union elections are expected at Dhaka University and other campuses. This resurgence has given Jamaat’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, fresh momentum, raising fears that confrontations in universities could spill over into national politics. Given that student movements have historically ignited larger political upheavals in Bangladesh, any violent turn on campuses could destabilise the pre-election environment.
The shadow of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina also looms. Forced into exile after mass protests toppled her 16-year rule, she has resurfaced in India, where reports suggest she is reorganising her party. Her ouster was driven by allegations of corruption, authoritarianism, and controversial elections devoid of voter participation. Yet her continuing influence, especially among segments of the Awami League, adds another unpredictable element to the political equation.
All of this plays out against a backdrop of economic fragility. Inflation remains high, the tax-to-GDP ratio one of the lowest in the region, and governance indicators among the weakest globally. Bangladesh ranks 108th in the Property Rights Index and 127th in the Economic Freedom Index, reflecting structural flaws that have long deterred investment and hindered growth. Public frustration is rising as living costs climb and reforms appear stalled.
At the same time, labour migration and remittances continue to provide a lifeline. They bolster GDP, stabilise foreign reserves, and sustain millions of households. Yet, even this vital sector faces challenges from high costs, exploitation, and reliance on informal channels. Without reform, this too could falter. Economic anxiety, if combined with political unrest, could further erode confidence in the democratic process.
What then lies ahead? In the best-case scenario, parties will compromise, the interim government will complete its reforms, and February’s polls will mark a new chapter of stability. A credible election could unlock much-needed political calm, attract investment, and set the country back on a path of growth. The alternative is more unsettling: boycotts, violent protests, or worse, a breakdown that invites another era of military dominance.
Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. Its people are weary of autocracy, corruption, and instability. They want a credible election and an accountable government that can deliver both economic opportunity and political peace. But that outcome depends less on promises from the interim administration and more on the willingness of political actors to compromise in the national interest.
For now, uncertainty reigns. The critical question remains: will the political deadlock be broken in time to ensure that February’s election restores democracy, or will it mark yet another missed opportunity in the nation’s troubled history?
Comments